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SECTION 8(e)-ENFORCEMENT OF A LAWFUL "HOT
CARGO" CLAUSE AGAINST A "NEUTRAL" CONTRACTOR
A "hot cargo" clause in a collective bargaining agreement
typically prohibits an employer from doing business with any firm
not affiliated with the contracting union. While such agreements are
generally proscribed by section 8(e) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act,' construction industry unions are outside this general pro-
hibition by virtue of an express exemption.2
The scope of the exempting proviso to section 8 (e) was examined
by the National Labor Relations Board in Ets-Hokin Corp.3 In that
case, Ets-Hokin and the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers had entered into a collective bargaining agreement which
contained the following clause:
The local Unions are part of the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers and any violation or annulment
of working rules or agreements of any other Local Union
of the IBEW, or the subletting, assigning, or transfer of any
work in connection with electrical work to any person, firm
or corporation not recognizing the IBEW as the collective
bargaining representative on any electrical work in the juris-
diction of this or any other such Local Union by the Em-
ployer, will be sufficient cause for the cancellation of this
agreement, after the facts have been determined by the Inter-
national Office of the Union.'
Nevertheless, Ets-Hokin sublet electrical work to a subcontractor,
Rose-Phoenix, whose employees were members of the Operating
Engineers, a union which competes fiercely with the IBEW for jobs
at construction sites. The IBEW threatened to terminate its contract
pursuant to the above clause unless Rose-Phoenix was removed from
the job. Ets-Hokin then removed Rose-Phoenix in order to avoid
the impact of the threatened IBEW termination.
In response to unfair labor practice charges arising from these
facts, the National Labor Relations Board held that the threat of
173 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any em-
ployer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains from handling, using, selling, transporting
or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person . ...
2 Ibd. :
Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement
between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry
relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site
of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure or
other work . . . .
3 154 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 60 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1965).
460 L.R.R.M. at 1046.
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termination violated sections 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Labor
Management Relations Act,5 but that the dismissal of Rose-Phoenix
under the agreement was lawful.' The Board arrived at these con-
clusions by finding that the clause in question was composed of two
severable elements: an agreement by Ets-Hokin not to subcontract
to non-IBEW employers, and a "termination" power to be invoked
should Ets-Hokin fail to comply with the subcontracting clause. The
first element was held to be lawful as coming within the construction
industry proviso to section 8(e) ,7 but the second was found to
be a "powerful private economic sanction to insure compliance with
the subcontracting clause," s a sanction which the Board felt was
forbidden by the act:
6 73 Stat 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (4) (A), (B) (1964):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) . . . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is-
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person
to join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any
agreement which is prohibited by section 8(e) ;
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . .doing business
with any other person ....
In regard to the 8(b) (4) (ii) (A) violation, which will not be further discussed
in this Comment, the Board said:
Having found the termination and sympathetic action features of the clause
unlawful under Section 8(e), notwithstanding the proviso, we do find, as did
the Trial Examiner, that Respondents IBEW and Local 796 violated Section
8(b) (4) (ii) (A) in coercing Ets-Hokin to remove Rose-Phoenix from the
Glen Canyon project, by threatening to enforce the termination clause in
Local 640's contract.
60 L.R.R.M. at 1049. (Citation omitted.)
6 Ets-Hokin, under §§ 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3), and the IBEW, under §§ 8(b) (2)
and 8(b) (1) (A), had been charged with unlawful discrimination resulting in the
discharge of Rose-Phoenix's employees. The sections under which the charges were
brought read as follows:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization ....
61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3) (1964).
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7; .. .
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) ....
61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (1), (2) (1964).
7 The "no subcontracting" contract provision has the following aspects: a
prohibition against subcontracting on a building construction site, and an
annulment clause. The first of these we have found to be lawful under the
construction industry proviso to Section 8(e) . ...
60 L.R.R.M. at 1049. After finding that the two aspects of the IBEW-Ets-Hokins
no-subcontracting clause-termination and prohibition-were severable, the Board
said that the lawful "prohibition" provision gave the union the right "to insist, albeit
not by proscribed means, that the Employers subcontract work only to IBEW sub-
contractors as required by the lawful part of the . . . contract." Ibid.
8 1d. at 1047. The IBEW stated in a supplemental memorandum to the Board
that such action could have "forced Ets-Hokin out of business.' Ibid.
1966]
118 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:116
[A] contract within the construction industry proviso .
may be enforced only through lawsuits and not by threats,
coercion or restraint proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (B).'
Self-help is not judicial action, even if a court or its
equivalent might grant the same remedy for breach of
contract . . . . Neither is the contract principle controlling,
that [when] . . . one party to a contract breaches a material
provision thereof, the other may elect to rescind it. We are
not administering the law of private contracts.1 0
The Board continued:
In Centlivre Village Apartments . . . [Northeastern Ind.
Bldg. Trades Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964)] the Board
held that coercion by a union to interrupt business relations
between a neutral general contractor and an identified subcon-
tractor came within the prohibition of Section 8(b) (4) (B).
Here the Trial Examiner found that the Union, by threaten-
ing to cancel its contract with Ets-Hokin, forced Ets-Hokin
to cancel its contract with Rose-Phoenix and thus violated
Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act. We agree."
0 Ibid. The Board's position is buttressed by the courts. The clear implication
of the decisions has been that only a judicial remedy would be allowed. See, e.g.,
Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Orange
Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See gen-
erally Grove, Obtaining and Enforcing Hot-Cargo Contracts in the Construction In-
dustry, 51 A.B.A.J. 732 (1965) ; 40 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1198 (1965).
The Board quoted the following passage from Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v.
Hardy Corp., supra at 686, to clarify what it meant by "coercion" forbidden by
§8(b) (4) (B) :
The term "coercion" as used means "non-judicial acts of a compelling or
restraining nature, applied by way of concerted self-help consisting of a strike,
picketing or other economic retaliation or pressure in a background of a
labor dispute."
Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 60 L.R.R.M. 1045, 1047 (1965). (Emphasis
added by NLRB.)
loIbid. (Emphasis added.) The "equivalent" the Board had in mind was prob-
ably arbitration.
The Board included the following in a footnote:
We realize that this conclusion may leave the union with a valid con-
tractual provision and with no means of enforcing it other than in a civil suit.
We also realize the difficulty the building crafts have with the secondary boy-
cott provision of the Labor-Management Relations Act, but this court is not
the forum in which to seek relief from what the union characterizes as "the
shackles" of this statute.
Id. at 1047 n.6, quoting from Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v.
NLRB, 321 F.2d 366, 370 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963). Presumably
the Board, like the circuit court, is not "the forum in which to seek relief from . . .
'the shackles' of [the] . . . statute."
"Id. at 1049. Member Fanning, dissenting in part, said:
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the contractual reservation of
the right to take economic action to enforce a lawful no-subcontracting clause
is itself violative of Section 8(e) of the Act. It seems anomalous to find
. . . that the incorporation of the so-called self-help provision . . .operates
lawfully to prohibit the employer from subcontracting to nonunion subcon-
tractors, even though the self-help provision itself violates Section 8(e). ...
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Thus the Board found that any attempt to enforce a lawful hot cargo
clause by means prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (B) would be unlawful.
It should be noted that in order to reach this conclusion, the Board
must have considered Ets-Hokin to be a "neutral" third party, 2 dis-
interested in the outcome of the union's "primary" dispute with Rose-
Phoenix. However, since Ets-E-okin put Rose-Phoenix on the job
it is difficult to believe that Ets-Hokin was, in fact, "neutral," par-
I should think that this case is governed by the rule . . . in Amalgamated
Lithographers . . . [Miami Post], 130 N.L.R.B. 968, 47 L.R.R.M. 1380 ...
The clear import of the Board's holding in Amalgamated Lithographers is
that a termination clause is lawful whenever the clause which it supports is
lawful, and it is wholly immaterial whether the latter clause is lawful because
it is primary in nature or because it falls within the construction industry
proviso and is thus excepted from the prohibition of Section 8(e) ...
Thus, the controlling distinction is that between economic action, such
as strikes, picketing, and other related conduct, on the one hand, and resort
to recognized legal or judicial remedies for breach of contract on the other.
Clearly, the IBEW lawfully could have filed suit . . . . But another, long-
accepted, remedy is available . . . . That remedy is the right to rescind the
contract. . . .
Certainly the articulation within the contract of this lawful right of elec-
tion of remedies should not have the anomalous effect of rendering unlawful
the exercise of that right, particularly where there is not the slightest evidence
that the Congress, having granted specific contractual rights to employers and
unions in the construction industry, then intended to deprive the parties to
such agreements of the well-established remedies for breach of those very
rights. . ...Finally, the majority's conclusion cannot be supported on the theory that
termination of the contract will be followed by a strike or picketing; a "no
contract-on [sic] work" theory. The record herein will not sustain a finding
that the termination threat included a threat to withdraw men or to picket
Ets-Hokin.
Id. at 1050-51. Cf. Hickey, Subcontracting Clauses Under Section 8(e) of the NLRA,
40 NoTn DAME LAW. 377, 388-89 (1965). See also Victor, "Hot Cargo" Clauses, 15
LAB. L.J. 269, 282 (1964).
12The congressional policy behind § 8(b) (4) as it existed in 1958 was best
explained by the Supreme Court in Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB,
357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958) (Sand Door) :
Congress' purpose was . . . narrowly conceived. It aimed to restrict the
area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the
most obvious, widespread, and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous prac-
tice of unions to widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers, them-
selves not concerned with a primary labor dispute, through the inducement
of their employees to engage in strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods.
See note 19 infra for the text of the old § 8(b) (4) (A).
The 1959 amendments adding §8(e) and expanding and clarifying §8(b)(4)
seem to confirm both aspects of the Supreme Court's statement that neutral parties
should be protected, and that the conflict should not be expanded. In fact, the pro-
tection of neutrals seems to be one of the best ways of limiting the spread of the
dispute, since otherwise they will be drawn in as either side seeks to strengthen its
position by finding allies. Viewed in this manner, the fundamental policy of the
secondary boycott provisions is the limitation of labor disputes and their impact upon
the rest of the economy. See 357 U.S. at 105-06. This is in accord with the declara-
tion of policy contained in § 1(b) of the act, 61 Stat 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b)
(1964), which reads in relevant part as follows:
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow
of commerce . .. to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and
management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare,
and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes
affecting commerce.
The protection of "neutrals," then, is not sacred in itself, but is merely a means of
achieving a desired end. Cf. Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The
Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b) (4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. R1v. 1000, 1041 (1965). See
also Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLum. L. Rxv. 1363 (1962).
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ticularly since subcontracting to Rose-Phoenix would have lowered
Ets-Hokin's labor costs, thus enabling it to make lower bids and, conse-
quently, to obtain more jobs. The present situation, then, is anomalous
in that the Board has reached a result which is called for by the law,
but which is belied by the facts.
There is, however, a partial recognition in the law that Ets-Hokin
and similar firms are not entirely "neutral" in that they can be
"coerced" into entering subcontracting agreements which are lawful
under the proviso to section 8(e)."3 The union may strike or apply
other economic sanctions to obtain such a clause as long as such action
is not aimed at an identified or existing subcontracting relationship. 4
But when the union seeks to enforce the clause by direct means in the
face of a breach, the mantle of "neutrality" envelopes the employer
with the protection of section 8 (b) (4) (B),", and the union is forbidden
to act, except through lawsuits or their equivalent. 6 The result is that
the so-called "neutral" employer can be subjected to union pressure
which will affect his choice of action in a labor conflict as long as the
pressure is removed in time and place from the incident-for example,
Ets-Hokin's breach of its subcontracting clause with the IBEW-
which provokes it. This removal is the essence of the only "enforce-
ment" procedure lawfully open to the union.
Thus the effect of the present law is to restrict labor conflict by
prohibiting the union from subjecting a "neutral" employer to economic
coercion at the time of provocation (i.e., breach). However, the law
does not prohibit the spread of the conflict to another time and place;
'3 See Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 537 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) ; Construction Laborers v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422, 424 (9th Cir. 1963).
'4 See Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 60 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1965). A
strike for a lawful hot cargo clause is unlawful only if it is an attempt by the union
to cause the employer to cease doing business with an identified subcontractor. Such
an attempt falls within the prohibition of § 8(b) (4) (B). Northeastern Ind. Bldg.
Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apartments), 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; cf. Building & Constr. Trades Council
v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
15 Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.
1964); NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 326 F.2d 213 (3d Cir.
1964); Construction Laborers v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963); see Essex
County & Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 641 (3d Cir.
1964) : "[A lawful hot cargo clause] is not a defense to an unfair labor practice charge
made under § 8(b) (4) (B) . .. .
16 105 CONG. REc. A8254 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1959), in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLosuRE AcT OF 1959, at 1858 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as 1959 LEG. HIsT.] (remarks of Senator Goldwater) :
Thus, although employers and unions who are under this exemption may
lawfully enter into such agreements, and may resort to the courts for their
enforcement under applicable principles of contract law, no coercion or
restraint-economic or otherwise-may be used by any party to such agree-
ment, even if entered into voluntarily by both parties, to compel the other
party to live up to the contract or to refrain from breaching it.
See Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); cases cited note 15 supra; 105 CONG. REc.
17900 (1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1433 (remarks of Senator Kennedy) ; 105 CONG.
REc. A8359 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1829 (remarks of Senator
Goldwater).
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the so-called "neutral" employer can be attacked in court, harassed
at the next bargaining session 17 or even prospectively disciplined by
the mechanism of a "hard" strike over some other issue, which none-
theless serves as a warning not to breach the hot cargo clause. A
fragmentation of the conflict through time is thus encouraged. The
limitation envisioned by Congress seems only to work momentarily
to preserve the employer's freedom of choice at the point of open
conflict.'
The situation with regard to construction industry unions, as it
presently exists, cannot be understood without reviewing the history
which produced it. In 1947, when the Labor Management Relations
Act was passed, the NLRB obtained jurisdiction over the on-site
practices of the building trades unions for the first time. 9 It has
17 1n other words, the union, at the next contract negotiation period, can "get
even" with an employer who has failed to live up to his lawful hot cargo obligation.
It might even be a good idea for the union to "get tough" prospectively, while bar-
gaining for the hot cargo clause, in order to discourage the employer from even
considering a breach of the agreement.
There is an inherent fault here, in that the law does not allow attention to become
focused on the breach at the time of its occurrence. There is not a present exami-
nation of a concrete problem leading to a specific solution. If a test of strength is
necessary, it is postponed (or anticipated) and disguised, in a sense making it a dry
run. This may be a good reason for a union to demand an arbitration clause dealing
with the hot cargo provision. At least this would result in timely action on the specific
problem. Cf. Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA
§§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1000, 1012 (1965):
It is apparent that the enactment of section 8(e) merely laid bare a problem
which was largely latent before then. Previously a subcontracting restriction
embodied or attempted to be embodied in a contract fell within the 1947 act
only if sought to be enforced through strike action; because of arbitration
and no strike provisions, generally such action was rarely taken. (Emphasis
added.)
Senator Kennedy commented:
The first proviso under new section 8(e) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is intended to preserve the present state of the law with respect to
picketing at the site of a construction project and with respect to the validity
of agreements relating to the contracting of work to be done at the site of a
construction project
105 CoNG. REc. 17900 (1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1433. From the foregoing com-
ments, and the NLRB's qualification "a court or its equivalent," see text accompanying
note 10 supra, it seems safe to conclude that arbitration is the best method of enforce-
ment open to a union faced with the breach of a lawful hot cargo agreement, if the
union wishes to avoid going to court or being charged with an unfair labor practice.
See Hickey, supra note 11, at 388-89; 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1198, 1202 (1966).
I8 Cf. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 105-06
(1958) (Sand Door).
19 Section 8(b) (4) (A) was enacted in 1947. In relevant part it read as follows:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any em-
ployer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other person to
cease . . . doing business with any other person ....
61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1964). Until this
section entered the law, the right of the construction industry unions to strike and
shut down an entire job was legally unchallenged. See Hearings Before the Special
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been said that inexperience with the peculiar problems of the con-
struction industry resulted in the NLRB's action in Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council.'0 In that case, the Denver Building Trades
Council picketed a construction site to protest the use of nonunion
labor by a subcontractor. As a result of the picketing, the employees
of the general contractor left their jobs. The Board found that the
picketing violated what was then section 8(b) (4) (A),2'1 in that it
put pressure, by means of concerted activity, on the general contractor
to "cease doing business with any other person." The general con-
tractor was regarded as a "neutral" to whom, therefore, the act ex-
tended protection. In affirming the Board's action, the Supreme
Court said:
We agree with the Board also in its conclusion that the fact
that the contractor and subcontractor were engaged on the
same construction project, and that the contractor had some
supervision over the subcontractor's work, did not eliminate
the status of each as independent contractor or make the
employees of one the employees of the other. The business
relationship between independent contractors is too well
established in the law to be overridden without clear language
doing so.'
That Denver Bldg. Trades did not preclude union strikes against
contractors with whom they had primary disputes was made clear in
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor on H.R.
6411 and Similar Bills, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on H.R. 6411] (statement of Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz).
2082 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1949), rev'd, 186 F.2d 326, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1950). After
noting that the usual secondary boycott seeks to cause a neutral to cease doing business
with some other employer with whom the union has a dispute, the circuit court said:
The situation before us is not of this character. . . . The pressure was limited
to the one job, which was picketed as a whole to make it wholly union and
in protest against the employment there of the nonunion electricians.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and affirmed the Board. NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). For a discussion of
the inexperience which may have led to this decision, see House Comm. on Education
and Labor, Situs Picketing, H.R. REP. No. 1041, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1041].
,21The scope of this section was enlarged by the 1959 amendments to the act.
See text accompanying notes 34-35 infra.
2 It seemed to matter little to the Supreme Court, on review, that the subcon-
tractor had been hired by the general contractor, or that if the general contractor
had put nonunion men on the job, the strike would have been lawful. See NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). Mr. Justice Douglas
made this point in his dissent. Id. at 692.
The problem is seen in its clearest form if a production line analogy is used.
Suppose that the general contractor were the owner of a single plant, and each step
on the line were performed by a subcontractor. Would there be separate businesses
for purposes of § 8(b) (4) ? It is ironic that a Board which does not "administer the
law of private contracts," see text accompanying note 10 supra, draws upon the
concept of an "independent contractor" found therein in order to sustain the finding
of an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (4) against a construction industry union.
See text accompanying note 23 infra.
2 341 U.S. at 689-90.
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Moore Drydock Co." In that case, the NLRB laid down the rules
which were to be applicable to "common-situs" picketing-picketing
which takes place where two or more independent employers occupy
the same premises or place of business. 5 The union could picket or
strike the primary, but only under conditions which minimized the
possibility that the neutral's workers on the construction site would
leave their jobs2
These two cases taken together left open the question whether
the union could strike, subject to the limitations of the Moore Drydock
rules, to enforce a contractual clause prohibiting the general contractor
from allowing men not affiliated with the contracting union to be put
on the job. The Denver Bldg. Trades case had settled the question
only with respect to striking the general contractor in the absence of
such a clause.
In 1958, the Sand Door" decision by the Supreme Court pro-
vided the answer. The Court held that a union could not enforce a
hot cargo agreement by means forbidden by section 8(b) (4) (A), i.e.,
a strike or an inducement of its members to strike.2" The hot cargo
clause remained available to the contracting parties,29 but its effective-
ness was limited by the restriction placed on the means of enforcement. °
24 Sailors' Union (Moore Drydock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). See Lesnick,
The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLum. L. REv. 1363, 1374 (1962), for
a discussion of the development and application of the Moore Drydock rules.
2- [The Board] set out four standards for picketing in such situations which
would be presumptive of valid primary activity: (1) that the picketing be
limited to times when the situs of dispute was located on the secondary
premises, (2) that the primary employer be engaged in his normal business
at the situs, (3) that the picketing take place reasonably close to the situs,
and (4) that the picketing clearly disclose that the dispute was only with the
primary employer.
Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 677 (1961).
26 [I]n the interest of shielding "unoffending employers" from disputes not
their own, the Board has taken a . . . restrictive view of common situs
picketing, requiring that it be conducted so as "to minimize its impact on
neutral employees insofar as this can be done without substantial impairment
of the effectiveness of the picketing in reaching the primary employees."
Building Trades Council (Markwell & Hartz, Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 60 L.R.R.M.
1296, 1298 (1965). This case contains a lengthy discussion of the present application
of the Moore Drydock rules to construction sites.
27Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (Sand
Door). The case came up in the form of a contention that a hot cargo clause was a
sufficient defense to an unfair labor practice charge under § 8(b) (4).
28 "[I]nducements of employees that are prohibited under § 8(b) (4) (A) in the
absence of a hot cargo provision are likewise prohibited when there is such a pro-
vision." Id. at 106. The version of § 8(b) (4) (A) referred to in this case is that
which was in force before the 1959 amendments to the act. The text appears in
note 19 supra.
2 Certainly the voluntary observance of a hot cargo provision by an employer
does not constitute a violation of § 8(b) (4) . . . its mere execution is not
. . . prima facie evidence of prohibited inducement of employees ....
357 U.S. at 108.
SOA lawsuit definitely remained a possible means of enforcement:
It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the unions cannot invoke the
contractual provision in the manner in which they sought to do so in the
present cases [as a defense to § 8(b) (4) charges] that it may not, in some
totally different context.. . stiU have legal radiations affecting the relations
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Thus, after the Sand Door decision, a union in the construction
industry could strike to obtain a hot cargo clause as long as the Moore
Drydock rules were observed; 3  however, its enforcement of the
clause, once obtained, was limited to whatever threats could be made
against the employer without violating section 8(b) (4) (A).32 The
unions also could, and apparently did, rely upon arbitration provisions
for enforcement of their lawfully obtained hot cargo clauses.33
In 1959, Congress amended the act: section 8(e) was addted,
which generally prohibited hot cargo agreements. Had section 8(e)
been enacted without an exception for the construction industry, the
building trades unions would have been virtually without means of
preventing unionized contractors from subcontracting their work to
nonunion employers and thereby subverting and avoiding their col-
lective bargaining agreements. This seemed to be enough of a dis-
advantage to the unions to cause Congress to include a special exemp-
tion in section 8(e).4
Another change was a broadening of section 8(b) (4) which
previously forbade only a strike or inducement of union members to
strike. The amended section was broken down into two parts:
8(b) (4) (A) forbade a union from entering into any agreement pro-
hibited by section 8(e); 8(b) (4) (B) made coercion or threats aimed
at an employer for the purposes of causing him to cease doing business
with "any other person" an unfair labor practice. 5 Under this new
between the parties. All we need now say is that the contract cannot be
enforced by the means specifically prohibited in § 8(b) (4) (A) [strike or
inducement to strike] ....
Ibid.
31 Cf. id. at 101-08.
32 See id. at 99:
Likewise, a union is free to approach an employer to persuade him to engage
in a boycott, so long as it refrains from the specifically prohibited means of
coercion ....
33 See Lesnick, supra note 17, at 1012:
It is apparent that the enactment of section 8(e) merely laid bare a problem
which was largely latent before then. Previously a subcontracting restriction
embodied or attempted to be embodied in a contract fell within the 1947 act
only if sought to be enforced through strike action; because of arbitration
and no strike provisions, generally sutch action was rarely taken. (Emphasis
added.)3
4 Remarks of Senator Kennedy:
Fourth. Hot cargo: . . . . The Senate insisted upon a qualification . . .
for agreements relating to work to be done at the site of a construction project.
Both changes were necessary to avoid serious damage to the pattern of col-
lective bargaining in these industries.
105 CONG. REc. 17899 (1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIsT. 1432. Cf. 105 CONG. REc. A8372
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1834 (remarks of Senator Douglas).
When § 8(e) was added to the law, there was also an attempt made to include a
proviso to § 8(b) (4) (B) which would have made union picketing in the Denver Bldg.
Trades situation lawful; however, it failed. The proposed addition to § 8(b) (4) (B)
was eliminated from the proposal of the House-Senate Conference Committee because
of a threatened point of order to be raised on the floor of the House. 105 CONG. Ec.
17901 (1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIsT. 1434. Its proponents dropped the measure
upon the promise that it would be brought up for action in the next session; they
were subsequently unable to gain passage of the proviso. Hearings on H.R. 6411,
at 9 (statement of Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz).3 5 See note 5 supra for relevant text
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language, the union could neither induce its own members to take
action nor threaten a neutral employer without violating section
8(b) (4). This expansion of section 8(b) (4) limited to an even
greater extent the means by which a building trades union could
obtain compliance with the terms of a hot cargo clause.
The question of what kind of enforcement action remains avail-
able after the 1959 amendments to a union which has lawfully obtained
a hot cargo agreement 86 is one to which the answer is not immediately
clear. Under the statutory language, there are at least three alterna-
tives, all of which are consistent with the legislative history indicating
that prior law-specifically, Denver Bldg. Trades, Moore Drydock and
Sand Door-was to remain undisturbed.3 7 Since Sand Door held that
any enforcement measures which violated section 8(b) (4) would be
illegal, the extent to which a hot cargo agreement is enforceable
by the union depends upon the interpretation given to section
8(b) (4) (B)'s new operative words, "coerce, restrain or threaten."
The first alternative is to read the words very broadly as pro-
hibiting any attempt whatsoever at enforcing the clause, even through
judicial action (or arbitration, which seems indistinguishable)," in
order to keep the employer's course of action as free from compulsion
as the law can make it. Although one district court espoused this
position, 9 it was overruled,' and no other court has entertained this
broad interpretation of "coerce."
The rejection of this broad interpretation rests in part on the
notion that Congress would not have made an exception for hot cargo
clauses in the construction industry if it had not intended that these
clauses were to be enforceable in some manner. Moreover, there is
substantial legislative history to the effect that Congress anticipated
that judicial enforcement of the exempted clauses would be available
3 6 Although the Board was slow in accepting the view, the courts and the Board
now hold that the language incorporating § 8(e) into § 8(b) (4) (A) also incorporates
the provisos to § 8(e). See Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 60 L.R.R.M.
1045, 1048 (1965):
In Centlivre Village Apartments [148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964)] the Board re-
examined its approach to this section and decided to adopt the view of various
courts that the proviso to section 8(e) is incorporated by reference into
section 8(b) (4) (A); hence an attempt by means condemned by section
8(b) (4) to obtain such a clause which is lawful under the construction
industry proviso falls outside the scope of section 8(b) (4) (A).
37 See Senator Kennedy's analysis of the construction industry proviso to § 8(e),
105 CoNG. REc. 17900 (1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1433; remarks of Senator Gold-
water concerning hot cargo agreements, 105 CoNG. REc. A8359 (daily ed. Sept. 24,
1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1829.
38 See notes 10, 17 supra and note 43 infra.
39 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 218 F. Supp. 556, 561-62
(N.D. Ala. 1963).
4 o Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir.
1964) :
[Wie think clear language would be necessary to convey a congressional
intent that a party to an otherwise valid labor agreement may not turn to
the courts for relief upon its breach.
126 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
to the unions.4 This evidence is reinforced by the following argument:
judicial enforcement, by definition, could not actually violate the
strictures of section 8(b) (4) (B), since a court, not a union, would
be doing the coercing.4" Thus the essence of the second alternative
open under the language of the statute is that judicial enforcement (or
arbitration) is the only lawful means by which a union may vindicate
its rights should the clause be breached. This position has achieved
general acceptance by the Board and the courts.'
The third alternative, which has not as yet been explored by
either the courts or the Board, is to hold lawful a self-executing clause,
such as a liquidated damages provision, which would, without any
forbidden coercion by the union, encourage the employer not to breach
the hot cargo clause. This provision could be arranged as an escrow
account to be forfeited upon the employer's breach.4
While this third alternative seems consistent with the general
statutory language and purpose, there remains a conceptual objection
to its acceptance by the Board and the courts: the self-enforcing
liquidated damages provision would allow the union to transmit strike
pressure through the conduit of the contract to the point in time when
the employer actually makes the decision whether to breach.4 5
41 Remarks of Senator Kennedy, supra note 37; remarks of Senator Goldwater,
=rpra note 37; 105 CoNG. REC. A8524 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1959), in 2 1959 LEG. HIST.
1858 (remarks of Senator Goldwater).
42 Cf. note 10 supra. A threat to apply judicial sanctions may initially look the
same as a threat to invoke economic sanctions of the forbidden type; however, to
use Member Fanning's logic (note 11 supra) in another application, in the view
of the NLRB the threat of termination takes on the same character as the underlying
sanction which supports the threat, and therefore, the threat itself is considered un-
lawful. Further, there has been a legislative judgment that judicial action is
permissible, see note 41 supra, while self-help is not. The distinction is logical in
that it is reasonable to think that the courts would not engage in the excesses commonly
associated with secondary boycott action. Perhaps only such excesses are to be con-
demned, not the actual boycott, at least in the Denver Bldg. Trades situation.
43 E.g., cases cited notes 15, 16 supra; Northeastern Ind. Bldg. Trades Council
(Centlivre Village Apartments), 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964). This is not to say that
arbitration is precluded. See notes 10, 17 supra. It can be considered as synonymous
with a judicial remedy, since, particularly in the context of this discussion, it has all
the attributes of judicial action. See Jones, Specific Enforcement of "Hot Cargo"
Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements by Arbitration and Under Section
301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 85 (1959). Cf. Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 344 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1965).
44 The Ets-Hokin agreement contains what appears to be an attempt at such a
self-enforcing clause, see text accompanying note 4 supra, but it is flawed, in that the
termination provision can be used as an implied threat to strike, a threat which is
clearly forbidden by § 8(b) (4) (B), and one which cannot be rendered harmless by
clothing it in the language of contract.
It was argued in Ets-Hokin Corp. that the invocation of the termination clause
would not necessarily mean a work stoppage; this argument was accepted by Member
Fanning in his dissent. Member Fanning thought that a "no contract-no work"
theory was inapplicable to the case, based on the findings of the trial examiner. 60
L.R.R.M. at 1051. A close examination of the clause lends credence to this theory,
since the union would not have to strike if the other IBEW-affiliated contractors did
not breach their hot cargo clauses. Such a development by itself could have crippled
Ets-Hokin.




This could occur in the sense that the union, being able to strike to
obtain the clause, could thereby extort terms so severe as effectively
to deprive the employer of any choice even at the time when Congress
has seen fit to protect this freedom of action.46
This "conduit" theory may underlie the Board's language in
Ets-Hokin, which would outlaw any "private economic sanction to
insure compliance with the subcontracting clause." 47 The Board
read the legislative history as "outlawing every form of private con-
tract rendered permissible by the building construction proviso to
Section 8(e)," 4 which would leave judicial action as the only means
of enforcing hot cargo clauses.
In summary, then, the present NLRB interpretation of sections
8(b) (4) (A) and (B) and 8(e) as they apply to the construction
industry is consistent with the statutory language and history. The
Board allows strikes to obtain hot cargo clauses permitted by section
8 (e) ; " it does not allow inclusion of provisions in those clauses which
would violate section 8(b) (4) (B) if implemented,5" nor does it allow
enforcement of lawful clauses by strikes or other means of coercion
forbidden by section 8(b) (4) (B).1 The Board maintains that only
judicial enforcement is available when the employer (construction con-
tractor) breaches a valid section 8(e) clause, because otherwise, apply-
ing both Sand Door and Denver Bldg. Trades, there would be un-
lawful coercion aimed at causing the employer to cease doing business
with another person.
Of course, this entire legal structure, particularly the specific
prohibitions concerning lawful enforcement of legal hot cargo clauses,
rests on the continuing vitality of Denver Bldg. Trades. It hardly
matters at this point whether the case was the result of inexperience.
It has been the law for the building trades unions for over fifteen
years, and, although several attempts have been made to secure
congressional approval of an amendment to section 8(b) (4) which
would overrule it and permit picketing of a "neutral" subcontractor, all
such attempts have failed. 2
46 See note 12 supra.
47 Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 60 L.R.R.M. 1045, 1047 (1965).
48 Id. at 1046. The Board is unlikely to retreat from this position since it was
reached over Member Fanning's strong dissent, see note 11 supra, which took a
position akin to that which would hold valid self-policing hot cargo clauses. The
Board feels rather strongly that it is "not administering a law of private contracts."
See Muskegon Bricklayers Union, 152 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 59 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1965);
40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1198 (1965).
49 Northeastern Ind. Bldg. Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apartments), 148
N.L.R.B. 854 (1964); accord, Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 60 L.R.R.M.
1045 (1965).
50 See notes 5, 7 supra and text accompanying notes 5-8 supra; 40 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1198 (1965).
51 Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 60 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1965).
52 See note 54 infra. Although the proposed amendments all failed, the fact that
the attempts were made seems to indicate that the proviso to § 8(e) does not protect
conduct forbidden by § 8(b) (4) (B); it adds weight to that part of the legislative
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The most recent in the chain of attempts to add a proviso to
section 8(b) (4) (B) which would allow common situs picketing in
the Denver Bldg. Trades situation is H.R. 10027.' Under the pro-
visions of this bill (and its many predecessors),' a union which faced
a breach of a section 8(e) clause by the employer-contractor could
strike the entire project in its attempt to eliminate the nonaffiliated
subcontractor. That a less broad solution would allow the union suc-
cessfully to enforce a lawful hot cargo clause cannot be doubted, since
I-.R. 10027 would allow common situs picketing whether or not there
was a valid hot cargo clause in effect. However, if the past is a
guide, any legislative relief which does come will very likely be in
the form of H.R. 10027.
55
Unless and until the legislature chooses to act, the present conflict
will remain in the law; the unions will be allowed a hot cargo clause
they cannot directly enforce, and the courts will be expected to
apply sanctions which would violate section 8(b) (4) (B) if used by
the unions. The structure of the statute is at war with itself; a
situation which can be explained in view of its legal history, but which
can be fully understood only by recalling the history of "conflict and
compromise" " out of which the act was born.
history which states that the existing law was to remain unchanged with reference
to the construction industry unions, specifically that the Sand Door and Denver Bldg.
Trades cases were to remain unimpaired. See H.R. REt. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959), in 1 1959 LEG. HisT. 943.
53 The relevant text of H.R. 10027, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress Assembled, That section 8(b) (4) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, is amended by inserting before the semicolon
at the end thereof: Provided further, That nothing contained in clause (B)
of this paragraph (4) shall be construed to prohibit any strike or refusal to
perform services or any inducement of any individual employed by any person
to strike or refuse to perform services at the site of the construction, alteration,
painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work, and directed at
any of several employers who are in the construction industry and are jointly
engaged as joint venturers or in the relationship of contractors and subcon-
tractors in such construction, alteration, painting, or repair at such site, and
there is a labor dispute, not unlawful under this Act or in violation of an
existing collective-bargaining contract, relating to the wages, hours, or other
working conditions of employees employed at such site by any of such em-
ployers and the issues in the dispute do not involve a labor organization which
is representing the employees of an employer at the site who is not engaged
primarily in the construction industry . . . . In determining whether several
employers who are in the construction industry are jointly engaged as joint
venturers at any site, ownership or control of such site by a single person
shall not be the only factor considered.
54 There has been a legislative attempt to overrule Denver Bldg. Trades in nearly
every Congress since the decision came down. See H.R. REP. No. 1041 (1965);
Hearings on H.R. 6411, at 2-12 (1965) (statement of Secretary of Labor Willard
Wirtz).
55 Every attempt made so far has been in the general form of H.R. 10027. Ibid.
56 See Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100
(1958) (Frankfurter, J.) (Sand Door).
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